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WAR, PEACE, AND VIOLENCE

FOUR CHRISTIAN VIEWS

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM

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A JUST WAR VIEW





A Just War View

Christian Approaches to War, Peace, and Security

ERIC PATTERSON

C. S. Lewis (1898–1963) was a survivor. Like so many who scraped through the Great War, he suffered trench fever, fought in bloody battles, endured a miserable winter in the trenches, and then was seriously wounded with shrapnel in three different parts of his body. He left the hospital, and the war, on Christmas Eve 1918, a confirmed atheist like so many others.

But he was no pacifist, not then, and not later when his Christian worldview had fully matured. He volunteered to serve a second time, at age forty, in World War II, perhaps as an instructor (he was denied), and subsequently joined the Local Defence Forces (Home Guard). He traveled the country speaking at Royal Air Force bases. One air marshal said that Lewis helped the pilots and aircrews understand what they were fighting *for*.

Lewis famously responded to the notion that “turn the other cheek” required pacifism in the face of the Nazis with this response: “Does anyone suppose that our Lord’s hearers understood him to mean that if a homicidal maniac, attempting to murder a third party, tried to knock me out of the way, I must stand aside and let him get his victim?”¹ Lewis was speaking common sense: we know in our hearts that we have a duty to protect the vulnerable. Lewis was also speaking from within the mainstream tradition of biblical and Christian thinking on issues of protection, the use of force, justice, and neighbor love. We often call that tradition “just war thinking” or “just war theory,” but it is really a much larger tradition that would better be termed “just war statecraft” or “just statecraft” because the tradition begins

¹C. S. Lewis, “Why I Am Not a Pacifist,” in *The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses*, ed. Walter Hooper (1949; repr., San Francisco: HarperOne, 2006), 86.

with broad issues of legitimate political authority, political order, and justice. All of our major Christian traditions accept applied just war reasoning in one form or another: Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, Anglican, Reformed, Wesleyan (and thus its Holiness and Pentecostal descendants), and Baptist.² The only tradition that entirely rejects just war thinking, because it denies the notion that Christians have a responsibility to public service, is the Anabaptist tradition, an anomaly that began in the sixteenth century and makes up less than 1 percent of Christendom.

Lewis wrote a great deal on issues of war, peace, and security. His academic work on medieval literature, which he taught at Oxford and Cambridge, steeped him in the ideas of chivalry, *noblesse oblige*, responsibility, and sacrifice. World War I forced him to consider mortality and the meaning of life, which he did in a short book of poems published in 1919. His fiction, written after he became a Christian, gives us scenes of heroes battling injustice, motivated by righteous indignation. Two of his most famous characters demonstrate the difference between the moral use of force and immoral violence. Dr. Weston, the evil mastermind of Lewis's Space Trilogy, justifies a rapacious conquest of other worlds in language that the Nazis or imperial Japan would have understood. Weston argues for a Nietzschean approach: he sees humanity (Earth) as superior and therefore justified in invading and using for our own purposes, other, inferior civilizations.

In contrast, Narnia's Reepicheep, a valiant mouse knight, leads his community to serve their country and Aslan. Reepicheep is particularly important as a role model: his love of Narnia, rightful patriotism, gives him a spiritual intuition that there is something bigger and better than his comrades or even his country. That *love* leads him to search out Aslan's Country. This is a portrait, according to Lewis in his discussion of patriotism in *The Four Loves*, of how love of one's home can point one to wider circles of neighbor love (e.g., love of country) and ultimately point us to love of God and his creation.

We live in an era when there is tremendous social confusion with regard to morality, ethics, patriotism, and the use of force. We hear moral

²For details of these denominational positions and the nuanced differences among them, see Eric Patterson and J. Daryl Charles, *Just War and Christian Tradition: Denominational Perspectives* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2022).

equivocations all the time, such as “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” We have seen the loss of respect for any sort of shared moral code and any form of authority, whether in the home, our churches, or in civic life. Many have—even in the church—lost the ability, or the will, to make right distinctions.

Getting back to Lewis’s remark, “Does anyone suppose that our Lord’s hearers understood him to mean . . . ?” we are faced with a challenge: Should you and I let evil go unopposed? Did anyone listening to Jesus think that he was preaching anarchy or revolution? Did they think he was preaching unqualified nonresistance to evil? Of course not. The God of the Bible is the God of love and justice. We live in a fallen world, a world that God has nonetheless assigned to us—despite our fallenness—to steward as his co-regents. We have responsibilities to him and to one another. That is the foundation of the great commandments, to love God and to love our neighbor.

How does one love one’s neighbor in one’s calling and in social life?

This book looks at these responsibilities from the perspective of just statecraft with a focus on issues of justice, order, authority, and the goal of peace. I will use the terminology just war “thinking,” “tradition,” and “statecraft” interchangeably to indicate a long-standing tradition in Christianity that focuses on the responsibility that people serving in government have for order, justice, and peace. Too often analyses of just war principles start with a narrow checklist, without examining broader foundations of biblical teaching. Thus, we will start with key biblical doctrines that inform how we are to see people living in society, such as the fact that a healthy society has people living out different *vocations* (callings) for the common good, just as there are a variety of gifts, symbolized by Paul as hands and eyes and feet, in the church. Some people are called to public service, where they serve as stewards of public order and justice. We see the principle of *stewardship* throughout the Bible, in the lives of leaders such as Joseph, Moses, Nehemiah, and David as well as in the Wisdom literature and parables, where wise kings count the cost of action and seek wise counsel.

The Bible says a considerable amount about the need for *political order* (i.e., a framework for the rule of law that protects the vulnerable, deters wrongdoing, and punishes violators). *Justice*, in its narrowest form, means getting what we deserve, and therefore should make Christians

particularly humble when it comes to civic life, because we know that “all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” and “the wages of sin is death” (Rom 3:23; 6:23).³ What we truly deserve is the full weight of God’s wrath. This should make us humble in dealing with our neighbors and vigilant toward unchecked evil. Unfortunately, the spirit of our age is the exact opposite, a haughtiness that demands the gratification of our rights and our desires. This becomes a form of idolatry, as Lewis noted in *The Screwtape Letters* and *The Four Loves*, whether in the form of radical personal autonomy (individual) or forms of collective chauvinism that makes my group superior to all others (nationalism, antisemitism, violent populism, racialism, etc.).

This chapter begins with the presuppositions, rooted in Christian doctrine, that are the foundation of just war statecraft. Then I will look at how Christians, from the first centuries of Christianity to today, have worked out a framework for responsible action in a competitive, sinful world. Classic just war reasoning argues that *political authorities* are authorized to utilize force when they are acting on a *just cause* and with *right intention*. Just as we can tell the difference between child abuse and loving but firm parental discipline, so too can we tell the difference between police or military brutality in contrast to limited, restrained, lawful use of force. This is the distinction between *force* (lawful, restrained) and *violence* (vengeful, unrestrained).

I will look at the just causes for employing force and the importance of right motivations. I will look at secondary, stewardship criteria that call for counting the cost, such as accounting the *likelihood of success* and taking all reasonable diplomatic measures before employing force (*last resort*). I will then go a step further and consider how force is used: it should be used in ways that are *proportionate* to the injustice, injury, or threat and should be used in ways that distinguish (*distinction*) between lawful targets, such as foreign military personnel, and unlawful and immoral targets (e.g., houses of worship, hospitals, innocent bystanders). I will then look at definitions of peace and the practical steps that must be taken to establish a just and enduring peace at war’s end (*jus post bellum*), a peace based first on a secure

³Unless otherwise indicated, Scripture quotations in this chapter are from the New American Standard Bible.

political order, that seeks justice, and that promotes conciliation. I will conclude with a look at how Christians are desperately needed to serve their fellow men and women in all phases of war and insecurity, from humanitarian assistance to diplomacy to healing and conciliation.

Why did Reepicheep carry a sword? Because he, as a knight of Narnia, lived in a dangerous world, he went to dangerous places, and he wanted to protect his family, countrymen, and his leaders. Although Reepicheep was easily offended, he was not an aggressor. He did not bully his fellow citizens. He did not seek to conquer or enslave foreigners. He was a protector, a defender, a champion. He was motivated by love: love of home, love of family, love of country, and, ultimately, in Lewis's rendition, love of God. That is the essence of just war statecraft.

THE DOCTRINAL UNDERPINNINGS OF JUST STATECRAFT

Christian ethicist Paul Ramsey (1913–1988) helps us understand the call of neighbor love (charity) in his retelling of the story of the good Samaritan.

It was a work of charity for the Good Samaritan to give help to the man who fell among thieves. But one step more, it may have been a work of charity for the inn-keeper to hold himself ready to receive beaten and wounded men, and for him to conduct his business so that he was solvent enough to extend credit to the Good Samaritan. By another step it would have been a work of charity, and not of justice alone, to maintain and serve in a police patrol on the Jericho road to prevent such things from happening. By yet another step, it might well be a work of charity to resist, by force of arms, any external aggression against the social order that maintains the police patrol along the road to Jericho. . . . What do you think Jesus would have made the Samaritan do if he had come upon the scene while the robbers were still at their fell work?⁴

Ramsey's voluminous writings on two areas of ethics, war and medicine, remain highly influential to this day. He emphasizes throughout his work on statecraft the unity of justice and charity (neighbor love), and he sought to explicate how this works out, particularly in the ways that public servants

⁴Paul Ramsey, *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility* (1968; repr., Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), 142–43.

respond to criminals, terrorists, nuclear deterrence and the arms race, and great power conflict.

The story of the good Samaritan is a window into a number of Christian doctrinal themes, and we will look at a number of them that provide the foundations for a Christian approach to statecraft, including the difference between the individual and those responsible for serving and protecting the group, political order, justice, neighbor love, sphere sovereignty, vocation (calling), and stewardship. One implication of the good Samaritan parable is that death itself is not the worst thing. “It is destined for people to die once, and after this comes judgment” (Heb 9:27). Augustine rightly pointed out that we will all die sooner or later. He argued, and Ramsey is picking up this theme, that there are times when it is appropriate for us, especially if we can protect the weak or serve in the public trust, to put ourselves in harm’s way. Reinhold Niebuhr, writing with World War II in mind, put it this way: “There are historic situations in which refusal to defend the inheritance of a civilization, however imperfect, against tyranny and aggression may result in consequences even worse than war.”⁵ Later in this chapter I will look at a few of the key thinkers in Christian history and how they distilled principles for decision making about the use of force.

There are three levels of analysis for thinking how society functions, and in particular the role individuals and governments play in issues of peace and security. The first level is the individual level, meaning my responsibilities at the most local level: my responsibility as a husband, as a father, as a neighbor, in my workplace, and in my local community. The second level of analysis is at the societal level, that of domestic politics and social life. This is where organizations, businesses, political parties, social movements, faith-based organizations and churches, and the organs of government operate. These collective organizations are run by people and work on behalf of people. They are responsible to promote interests of those they represent and to promote the common good. The third level of analysis is the international level, where most war takes place. This is the level primarily inhabited by the governments of countries, but it is also the realm of some international

⁵Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Christian Faith and the World Crisis,” *Christianity and Crisis*, February 6, 1941, 4.

organizations and multinational corporations. There is no overarching government at this level, so it is incumbent on governments to defend their citizens from adversaries, from terrorists to ideological competitors. Again, the heads of those governments, agencies, corporations, and other entities are all people.

This way of seeing the world is important when one understands that an individual may have responsibilities across the levels of analysis. Here is a case in point. A friend of mine is a Navy admiral. When he is home on shore leave, much of his life is as a private citizen. His local responsibilities to his wife, children, the PTA, his local congregation, the Rotary club of which he is a member, his aging parents, and the like all take precedence. Some recognize these basic relationships as having a covenantal character, particularly as a member of a family, a local church, and as a citizen; thus the term “private” citizen is a bit of a misnomer. For my friend, these relationships, expressed as fatherhood, husband-hood, and so on, are one element of his *calling* in this life. But he has not stopped being a Navy admiral. If called to occupational service, as he was during ongoing Middle East conflicts, he goes to sea and he becomes an agent acting on behalf of the United States government and its allies at the third level of analysis. This is also his vocation, his God-ordained calling. He may be called on to make decisions that are literally life or death to defend his sailors, to protect those in foreign lands at risk of genocide, or to punish criminals, pirates, and terrorists. He does so under the legitimate authority entrusted to him by the president of the United States, the Congress, and US law. Moreover, his professional vocation is motivated by love, not hate: the desire to defend the lives, livelihoods, and way of life of his family, community, and country.

The admiral gives us a picture of how “turn the other cheek” is actually supposed to work. When he is home and his lawnmower strays over the neighbor’s sprinklers, the admiral must take responsibility for that, even if it results in a tongue lashing. This is when turning the other cheek is an act of the fruit of the Spirit. Moreover, he is called to be patient and humble, often turning the other cheek as a husband (“love your wives, just as Christ also loved the church” [Eph 5:25]) and as a father (“do not provoke your children” [Eph 6:4]). Most importantly, if attacked for his faith, he must turn the other cheek. The greatest witness is to never deny Christ when we

are mocked or attacked for the faith. That is when one must turn the other cheek even to the point of death.

Understanding the doctrine of calling (vocation), that God gives everyone skills and talents to be used for the common good, and recognizing that we live simultaneously in various roles with various responsibilities at the three levels of analysis can help us to best understand that God calls and empowers some individuals to employ force to protect, prevent, and punish.

Christians have doctrines that illuminate both the responsibility and restraint that need to be practiced in civic life. Catholics have a doctrine known as subsidiarity, the general principle that problems should be handled at the lowest level of analysis whenever possible. So the first institution to handle a problem should be a family, but when the family cannot deal with it, it goes to the neighborhood (including the local church and extended family), then local government, and perhaps if the problem is big enough, to state or federal authorities. Catholics and Protestants agree that God has created various institutions (i.e., family, church, government) and that he has given humanity the creativity to create additional institutions (e.g., business, education). In most cases, the immediate institutions—the family—can nurse an ill child, but local charity may need to support the family during a prolonged sickness. Government might have to be involved if this is not a localized illness but it is rather a spreading epidemic. Of course, when it comes to organized crime or foreign aggressors, it is those higher levels that are responsible to defend the citizenry.

Protestants, particularly in Reformed circles, emphasize a slightly different approach to the levels of analysis called sphere sovereignty. Like subsidiarity, sphere sovereignty begins with the idea that God is a God of order and he has instituted various arrangements of authority for our lives. The Bible does not give us a single model of civic government, and thus it is human creativity that has come up with different arrangements, such as constitutional monarchy and democracy, for organizing society. A basic political order, as I have written elsewhere, provides at least three features: basic law and order provided by law enforcement and government institutions (traditional security), governance (domestic politics and the provision of basic services), and international security (secure from immediate external

threats). The principle of political order and good governance is entirely congruent with righteous leadership whether in Israel's oligarchic period (books of Joshua and Judges), monarchy, or the teaching of Romans 13 in the New Testament.

Sphere sovereignty recognizes government as one among many institutions in society (the second level of analysis—collective social life), including the family and the church. According to Dutch theologian, pastor, and later prime minister of the Netherlands Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920), we should think of society as full of different sectors (“spheres”): business, academia, church and religious organizations, education, the family, government, and so on. Each of these sectors has its own rationale and rules and should be largely independent within its own sphere of influence. All of these spheres are subservient to God. God intends for the skills and talents of humanity to interact for the common good, so Kuyper portrays society like a huge clock mechanism, with all of the interlocking gears having important independent functions but, at the same time, being interdependent and interlocking for the good of society.

Sphere sovereignty suggests that there are those whose role it is to protect domestic society, such as the military and law enforcement, so that all the gears of society can function properly. When we think back to Ramsey's expanded notion of the good Samaritan parable, we can see many of these principles at work. The application, when it comes to statecraft, is this: How do we pursue order, justice, and peace in a fallen world? Christian thinkers provide us with principles of statecraft that do just that.

CHRISTIAN STATECRAFT: KEY THINKERS AND THE JUST WAR FRAMEWORK

Christians have been writing about issues of war, peace, and security for two millennia. These approaches can take a number of names, the most common being “Augustinian,” “just war,” or Niebuhrian “Christian realism.” Despite minor differences, all are forms of “Christian realism” that oppose fantastical, idealistic approaches to the tough dilemmas of politics and society (another chapter in this book looks at the uniquely Niebuhrian form of Christian realism). The approach of this chapter is to focus on the stream of classical just war thinking that goes back to the first centuries of

Christianity and is rooted in natural law as well as biblical texts. Before taking a look at a Christian critique of irresponsible pacifism and vengeful holy war, the following are three of the key historical thinkers who are widely recognized, across denominational lines, as seminal Christian exponents of just war statecraft.

Augustine. At the end of the fourth century AD, Augustine (354–430) pondered the conditions for the just employment of force in political life.⁶ Augustine’s formulation of the just use of force relies heavily on the notion of *caritas*, or charity: “Love your neighbor as yourself.” In domestic society as well as international life, how does one go about loving one’s neighbor? Augustine argues that within society, adherence to the rule of law, including punishment of lawbreakers, was a way of loving one’s neighbors. When one loves one’s neighbors, one refrains from harming them and supports the authorities in their efforts to provide security to the citizenry. Moreover, Augustine notes, neighbor love means protecting one’s neighbors when they are attacked, even if one must apply force to protect them. Augustine uses Romans 13:1-5 to argue that sovereign authorities have a responsibility to order and to justice, including the use of the sword:

Every person is to be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those which exist are established by God. Therefore whoever resists authority has opposed the ordinance of God; and they who have opposed will receive condemnation upon themselves. For rulers are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil. Do you want to have no fear of authority? Do what is good and you will have praise from the same; for it is a servant of God to you for good. But if you do what is evil, be afraid; for it does not bear the sword for nothing; for it is a servant of God, an avenger who brings wrath on the one who practices evil. Therefore it is necessary to be in subjection, not only because of wrath, but also for the sake of conscience.

Augustine suggests that this is also true with regard to foreign threats: loving our neighbor can mean self-defense of the polity. Likewise, loving our foreign neighbors may mean using force to punish evildoers or right a wrong. Aquinas summarizes this thought of Augustine’s in his *Summa*:

⁶Some material in this section is adapted from Eric Patterson, “Just War Theory and Terrorism,” *Providence*, November 30, 2016, <https://providencemag.com/2016/11/just-war-theory-terrorism/>.

“True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.”⁷ Oliver O’Donovan comments that Augustine’s typology suggests “defensive, reparative, and punitive objectives” of the decision to go to war.⁸

In addition to neighbor love, Augustine’s writings suggest a second reason for *jus ad bellum*: order. Augustine consistently privileges political order over disorder. The Augustinian conception of the universe is one in which God is the ultimate creator, judge, arbiter, and end. Although God allows sin and imperfection in this world, he nonetheless sustains the universe with a divine order. This order is mirrored in society by the political order with its laws and hierarchy. Augustine argues that although the city of man is a poor reflection of the city of God, nonetheless it is the political principle of temporal order that most approximates the eternal order.⁹ During his lifetime Augustine witnessed the alternative: the breakdown of the Pax Romana, the looting of Rome, and ultimately the sacking of his home in North Africa in the final days of his life. Augustine’s fear of political disorder was thus more than a distaste for regime change; it was dread of losing civic order with all of its attendant moral duties and opportunities.

Today, many Christians want to focus on the importance of loving one’s neighbor but neglect Augustine’s presupposition that political order is the foundation for society.¹⁰ Augustine’s argument is that the government has a responsibility to both domestic and international security—a responsibility that people serving in public office are duty bound to administer.

Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas (1225–1274) was the great scholastic expositor of Augustine. He argued that a war is just when it meets three

⁷This quotation from Augustine is referred to in Aquinas’s statement following objection 4 in Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica: Complete English Edition in Five Volumes*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Christian Classics, 1981), II-II, q. 40, art. 1.

⁸Oliver O’Donovan, *The Just War Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 53.

⁹Roger Epp, “The Augustinian Moment in International Politics,” *International Politics Research Papers*, no. 10 (Aberystwyth, UK: Department of International Politics, University College of Wales, 1991).

¹⁰This debate—how to employ the law of love in a violent world—turned many Christian pacifists such as Reinhold Niebuhr away from pacifism and toward “Christian realism” in the 1930s and 1940s. The Christian realist argument reflects Augustinians’ call for this-worldly policies to thwart evil, even if such policies dirty the hands of those engaged in fighting for justice and order. See Eric Patterson, ed., *The Christian Realists* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), esp. chap. 1.

requirements: sovereign authority, just cause, and right intent. It is noteworthy that Aquinas began not with just cause or right intent, but with sovereign authority:

In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war. . . . And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers . . . so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies.¹¹

In short, Aquinas saw most violence as criminal and lawless. The fundamental purpose of the state was to provide a counterpoise to lawlessness. Ergo, the legitimate use of force should only be in the hands of the rightful authorities in order to promote security.

Aquinas also argued that states should be concerned with just cause. He writes, “Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.” He quotes Augustine: “Wherefore Augustine says: ‘A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly.’”¹² Aquinas’s conception of just cause is richer than the contemporary debate on self-defense because it includes punishing wrongdoing and restitution of some sort to victims. Indeed, it seems that Aquinas’s just cause would support the use of force to curb aggressive non-state actors, protect individual human life via humanitarian intervention, and punish rogue regimes that disrupt the international status quo.

Third, Aquinas said that the just resort to force requires just intent. Scholars and churchmen alike have long pointed out the dilemmas of ascertaining right intent. For the average soldier, the medievals solved this

¹¹Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* II-II, q. 40, art. 1.

¹²This continues Augustine’s quotation from above in Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* II-II, q. 40, art. 1.

problem by providing absolution to their troops before battle and sometimes providing it again after the battle for the survivors. This did not completely solve the problem of rage and bloodlust on the battlefield but sought a spiritual solution to a very human dynamic.

However, this says little about the sovereign's motivation. Contemporary politics makes the situation even more complex because most state decisions are not made by a sovereign individual such as a king or empress. Western governments are pluralistic, representing multiple voices and acting based on a complicated set of interests and ideals. However, Aquinas's focus on right intent does not necessarily call for agonizing over one's ethical motivations. He writes, "Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil." In other words, Aquinas's idea of right intent is that states should seek to advance the security of their people and avoid wars based only on greed or vengeance. Aquinas again cites Augustine: "Hence Augustine says: 'The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war.'"¹³ Aquinas would likely agree that in contemporary international politics, the right intent of states is to seek their own security and then promote human life and flourishing around the world.

Vitoria. In the sixteenth century a Catholic friar and professor at the University of Salamanca, Francesco de Vitoria (1483–1546), responded to European defense against the Turks as well as Spain's activities in the New World using an expanded just war criterion based on Augustine and Aquinas. Vitoria, citing Augustine and Aquinas, argues that wars can be just if fought by legitimate authorities with right intent on behalf of a just cause. However, Vitoria asserts numerous limits on the prosecution of war, even on behalf of faith. For instance, Vitoria argues that it is wrong to kill noncombatants such as women, children, "harmless agricultural folk," "clerics and members of religious orders," and even enemy prisoners who are no longer a threat. Vitoria writes, "The reason for this restriction is clear: for these persons are innocent, neither is it needful to the attainment of victory that they should

¹³Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* II-II, q. 40, art. 1.

be slain. It would be heretical to say that it is licit to kill them. . . . Accordingly, the innocent may not be slain by (primary) intent, when it is possible to distinguish them from the guilty.”¹⁴ Vitoria’s use of just war theory gives us guidelines that today we call proportionality and distinction (discrimination, noncombatant immunity).

Much more could be said about the ways Christians have continued to flesh out just war statecraft and thus created a foundation for what we today call the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law. This is a seminal achievement that is rooted in Christian just war thinking. In recent decades Christians have continued to write in the tradition of Augustine and just war statecraft: Reinhold Niebuhr and his contemporaries called America to arms against the evil of the Nazis; Paul Ramsey explicated the ethics of nuclear deterrence; Jean Bethke Elshtain defined “equal regard” as the duty to protect the victims of genocide; Elshtain, George Weigel, and James Turner Johnson explained the twin evils of Saddam Hussein butchering his own people and neighbors *and* those who would deny the United Nations and governments for righting Hussein’s wrongs; J. Daryl Charles and Timothy Demy demonstrated the nuances in various Christian denominational positions on just war thinking and addressed considerations of calling and vocation; Joseph Capizzi has written a masterful book on political order in Christian history; I have championed a robust *jus post bellum*; Marc LiVecche has extended Christian thinking to moral injury and the practical implications for sending and receiving soldiers; and the list goes on.

The shared set of principles that all of these thinkers generally agree on is made up of three elements: the morality of going to war (*jus ad bellum*), the morality of how war is fought (*jus in bello*), and the morality of war’s ending (*jus post bellum*).

¹⁴Quoted in Richard Shelly Hartigan, “Francesco de Vitoria and Civilian Immunity,” *Political Theory* 1, no. 1 (1973): 83. This discussion can be found in Vitoria’s work *De Indis et de Iure Belli Reflectiones*, ed. Ernest Nys, trans. J. P. Bate (New York: Oceana/Wildy and Sons, 1964), \$449, <https://archive.org/details/franciscidevicto000vito/page/n5/mode/2up>.

JUS AD BELLUM

- **Legitimate authority:** Supreme political authorities are morally responsible for the security of their constituents and therefore are obligated to make decisions about war and peace.
- **Just cause:** Self-defense of citizens' lives, livelihoods, and way of life are typically *just causes*; more generally speaking, the cause is likely *just* if it rights a past wrong, punishes wrongdoers, or prevents further wrong.^a
- **Right intent:** Political motivations are subject to ethical scrutiny; violence intended for the purpose of order, justice, and ultimate conciliation is just, whereas violence for the sake of hatred, revenge, and destruction is not just.
- **Likelihood of success:** Political leaders should consider whether their action will make a difference in real-world outcomes. This principle is subject to context and judgment, because it may be appropriate to act despite a low likelihood of success (e.g., against local genocide). Conversely, it may be inappropriate to act due to low efficacy despite the compelling nature of the case.
- **Proportionality of ends:** Does the preferred outcome justify, in terms of the cost in lives and material resources, this course of action?
- **Last resort:** Have traditional diplomatic and other efforts been reasonably employed in order to avoid outright bloodshed?

JUS IN BELLO

- **Proportionality:** Are the battlefield tools and tactics employed proportionate to battlefield objectives?
- **Discrimination:** Has care been taken to reasonably protect the lives and property of legitimate noncombatants?

JUS POST BELLUM^b

- **Order:** Beginning with existential security, a sovereign government extends its roots through the maturation of government capacity in the military (traditional security), governance (domestic politics), and international security dimensions.
- **Justice:** Getting one's just deserts, including consideration of individual punishment for those who violated the law of armed conflict and restitution policies for victims when appropriate.
- **Conciliation:** Coming to terms with the past so that parties can imagine and move forward toward a shared future.

^aThis formulation derives directly from Augustine, as recorded in Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Christian Classics, 1981), II-II, q. 40, art. 1.

^bThese criteria are not enshrined in historic just war thinking but are distilled from various sources elaborated on by Patterson initially in 2004. See also Eric Patterson, *Ethics Beyond War's End* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012); and Patterson, *Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Post-Conflict* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).

Figure 1. Just war criteria

Christians are rightly concerned about peace. Societal peace is a secure, rightly ordered community, at peace within itself and with its neighbors. Aquinas, following the Roman statesman Cicero, rightly said that the purpose of a just war is peace. Thus, Christians should be concerned with a prudential approach to the ethics of war's end (*jus post bellum*): postconflict settlements should exhibit restraint in their terms while pursuing justice (restitution, punishment), in contrast to a so-called victor's peace based on vengeance and destruction. A Christian approach to war's end is moral in seeking punishment and restoration as well as focusing on a shared, secure future rather than on revenge for historic or imagined grievances. Figure 2 demonstrates a model for how a sturdy framework of political order can lay the groundwork for efforts at justice and, ultimately, conciliation.¹⁵




Figure 2.

More specifically, *jus post bellum* requires moral accountability for past actions, including the decisions by leaders (*jus ad bellum*) that led to war in the first place. There should be accountability for those in power who are responsible for the advent of conflict; in fact, at times our military response is an act of justice. A Catholic successor to Vitoria, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), wrote, “The only reason for it [war] was that an act of punitive justice was indispensable to mankind.”¹⁶ Generally, the breakdown of international peace is a complex set of circumstances, but in many cases war is directly attributable to the aggressive policies of a specific regime

¹⁵I developed this model in *Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in Post-Conflict* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).

¹⁶Quoted in O’Donovan, *The Just War Revisited*, 18.

or cabal within the regime, such as Hitler's Nazis or radical Hutus in Rwanda (1994). Leaders are responsible for peace and security; when they abrogate that obligation, it may be appropriate to hold them accountable in postconflict settlements.¹⁷

The same is true for *jus in bello* violations. Soldiers and their leaders on both sides are responsible for their conduct during the fighting. A richer notion of just peace is one in which steps are taken to hold those who willfully broke the laws of war in combat accountable for their misdeeds.

A related moral principle of *jus post bellum* is restitution. Of course, the destructive nature of war means that a complete return to the prewar status quo is impossible, and may not be desirable in cases of secession or civil war. Citizens, both in and out of uniform, have died. Vast sums have been expended. Natural resources and regions of land have been used up or destroyed. *Jus post bellum* takes the cost of war, particularly the cost in lives and material, into account and argues that when possible, aggressors should provide restitution to the victims. This principle applies both to inter- and intrastate conflict: at war's end aggressors should remunerate, when appropriate and possible, the wronged.

An additional moral concern that *jus post bellum* addresses is that of punishment. Punishment is punitive action against a wrongdoer. It may mean loss of rank or position, fines, imprisonment, exile, or death. Thus, punishment is the consequence of responsibility and an important feature of postconflict justice. Punishment is moral in that it moves beyond an abstract conception of accountability by employing sanctions against those responsible for initiating violence or transgressing the war convention and violating international law. As I will argue later in this chapter, punishment is a lost strand of just war theory.

Finally, a Christian approach to postconflict looks toward conciliation, defined as coming to terms with the past, so that we can see our former adversaries as partners in a shared peace. This is not easy. The principles of order and justice provide a foundation for political conciliation among nations that were formerly in conflict. Such conciliation is the ultimate step

¹⁷Material in this and the following three paragraphs is adapted from Eric Patterson, *Just War Thinking: Morality and Pragmatism in the Struggle Against Contemporary Threats* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 83-84.

toward building a durable framework for domestic and international peace. One can see the role of Christians seeking justice and conciliation at the end of various conflicts. The fact that apartheid-era South Africa did not fall apart into civil war and later developed its Truth and Reconciliation Commission is largely due to the role that Christian teaching, expounded and modeled by people like Archbishop Desmond Tutu, played in laying out an alternative to mass violence. Abraham Lincoln routinely cited biblical texts about restoration and reconciliation (“bind up the nation’s wounds”) as his philosophy for how the Civil War should end. He was directly opposed by the Radical Republicans, his own party, who hungered for vengeance. President Woodrow Wilson, the son of a minister and for many years a practicing Presbyterian, developed his famous Fourteen Points as a vision for a postwar European, and global, order rooted in the golden rule.

MISTAKEN ALTERNATIVES TO JUST STATECRAFT: PACIFISM AND HOLY WAR

As noted above, the vast majority of Christians across denominations and down through history have been part of traditions that have affirmed just statecraft. Martin Luther and John Calvin specifically mention their intellectual antecedents, routinely citing Augustine in particular. Nevertheless, there are variants distinct from mainstream, biblical thinking on issues of war, peace, and security that should be briefly addressed: pacifism and holy war. When one carefully considers the doctrines outlined above, notably how neighbor love is to be enacted by responsible citizens and leaders in a fallen world, neither pacifism nor holy war offers a compelling alternative to loving, prudential, restrained action.

Pacifism. J. Daryl Charles (1950–) convincingly documents that Christian history provides no evidence that the early church took a unified pacifist position, although many second- and third-century Christians were apparently pacifists.¹⁸ John the Baptist, Jesus, Peter, and Paul all engaged directly

¹⁸Charles reports on the historical context and position of early church fathers such as Tertullian (who thought that political and military service were forms of pagan sacrifice) and Origen—both of whom admit that Christians were serving in the Roman military. J. Daryl Charles, “Presumption Against War or Presumption Against Injustice? The Just War Tradition Reconsidered,” *Journal of Church and State* 48, no. 3 (fall 2005): 335–69. Charles points out that even the Quaker pacifist Roland Bainton suggests that the occupation of soldiering was likely not completely off-limits to

with tax collectors, soldiers, and Roman public officials. Lewis captures the biblical ethic in his critique of pacifism. He interprets “turn the other cheek” as allowing for force in situations in which certain factors demand it, saying of this view:

It harmonises better with St. John Baptist’s words to the soldier and with the fact that one of the few persons whom our Lord praised without reservation was a Roman centurion. It also allows me to suppose that the New Testament is consistent with itself. St. Paul approves of the magistrate’s use of the sword (Romans 13:4) and so does St. Peter (1 Peter 2:14).¹⁹

Notably, New Testament leaders, including Christ, never commanded soldiers or the other public servants to quit their work. John the Baptist instructed soldiers to avoid abusing their power. Jesus said that a Roman centurion had the greatest faith in Israel. Peter’s first Gentile convert was a Roman centurion and his family, a man who was already a devout seeker of God.

Nevertheless, it is true that there were compelling motives for many Christians to be skeptical of serving the political authority of the day, which was sinful Rome.²⁰ Christians, like Jews, opposed the idolatry and emperor cult of Rome and were persecuted by taxation and later imprisonment, crucifixion, and martyrdom in the arena. A good illustration of what the church was teaching can be seen in Acts 15, the teaching that the Council of Jerusalem gave to newly converted Gentiles. Did Gentile followers of the Way have to undergo circumcision and live by the ceremonial obligations of the Jewish law? No, but they were enjoined to avoid meat offered to idols and abstain from sexual immorality. Why these two? Sexual morality is the fundamental basis for the purity of the family and thus a building block for God’s design for society. Moreover, in the Roman and Near Eastern world, sexual promiscuity was not only rampant but also encouraged. For instance, some temples had cultic prostitutes, both male and female, and many

early Christians. See Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace* (New York: Abingdon, 1960), 66, 81.

¹⁹Lewis, “Why I Am Not a Pacifist,” 87.

²⁰Frederick H. Russell discusses how the limited teaching of Christ on violence ultimately resulted in early church leaders, such as Origen and later Ambrose and Augustine, having to define a Christian position on military service, allegiance to the state, and war in general. See Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), chap. 2.

politico-religious ceremonies disintegrated into debauchery and sexual immorality. Likewise, food offered to idols is suggestive of the many ways that pagan religious practices were a part of the Greco-Roman world, including the sacrifice of animals that later ended up in butcher's stalls, and thus Christians were trying to avoid practicing or reinforcing idol worship.

Moreover, if one served in the Roman army, there were severe restrictions on marriage: Caesar Augustus had made it virtually illegal to marry if one served in the legions (one could not legally marry until one had served a decade or more).²¹ This encouraged prostitution just outside the camp gates as well as rape of the defeated as a common practice of warfare. In the best cases, legionaries took common-law wives outside of legal norms. In short, there were real consequences to public service in the Roman world, but many people came to faith while serving in government administration or in the military. Thus the church was not entirely pacifistic but tried to find the best ways to counter *the idolatrous claims of the state on the individual*.²²

Over time a secondary pacifism did develop, as Christian scholars such as Augustine and Aquinas differentiated between the citizen's duty to the state, including military service, and the pacific duties of church leaders.²³ In other words, those living the spiritual vocation (pastors, monks, priests) were not to fight, but that did not mean that government was to leave them unprotected, nor did it mean that their parishioners should not protect and defend. Augustine famously made this point in a letter to a Roman military officer named Boniface in AD 418. Augustine exhorted Boniface to fulfill his calling and fight against temporal enemies who seek to destroy the peace, while distinguishing it from the clergy's vocation of spiritual warfare.²⁴

²¹Adrian Goldsworthy, *Pax Romana: War, Peace, and Conquest in the Roman World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 191.

²²For a look at historical and contemporary Christian pacifism from its most famous contemporary defender, see John Howard Yoder, *The Original Revolution: Essays on Christian Pacifism*, Christian Peace Shelf Series (Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 2003). A history of the application of pacifism in American politics is Theron F. Schlabach and Richard T. Hughes, eds., *Proclaim Peace: Christian Pacifism from Unexpected Quarters* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997).

²³For a brief introduction to this entire controversy, see James Turner Johnson, "Just War, as It Was and Is," *First Things*, January 2005, 19.

²⁴Augustine of Hippo, *Letter 189 (NPNF¹ 1:552-54)*, Christian Classics Ethereal Library, www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf101.vii.1.CLXXXIX.html?highlight=augustine,letter,boniface,war#fna_vii.1.CLXXXIX-p3.2.

For Augustine, the law of love includes punishment (consequences for immoral behavior) and justice (restoration of what was taken, righting past wrongs).

Fast-forward to the Reformation. Many of the concerns that the early church had about idolatrous Rome echo in the critiques Martin Luther, John Calvin, and others directed at the Roman Catholic Church. One splinter group from the Reformation is Anabaptism (not to be confused with today's Baptists), and this line of thinking is the foundation for Christian pacifism in the modern era.²⁵ The foundational statement of the Anabaptist movement is the Schleithem Confession of 1527, which makes three key points that are a response to Old Testament forms of legal authority ("magistracy") and the teaching of Romans 13 that "the ruler wields the sword for your good":

1. The "use of the sword" (force) is "ordained by God" but "outside the perfection of Christ." Thus it is appropriate for "worldly magistrates" to "punish," "put to death the wicked," and "guard and protect the good." Within the church, however, the strongest use of force is "the ban" (excommunication).
2. Just as "Christ was meek and lowly," it is not appropriate for Christians to "employ the sword against the wicked for the defense and protection of the good." Christians should not take any job that would cause them to employ force (law enforcement, military) nor should they take an office (judge, certain political jobs) that would cause them to make judgments between unbelievers.
3. Christians should pray for those in worldly authority because those individuals do the important work of limiting evil in a fallen world. But Christians should not participate.²⁶

²⁵There is a second strain of pacifism, "nonviolent action," that has roots outside of Christianity in the social movement started by Gandhi. There is no historical evidence of carefully planned Christian nonviolent resistance strategies such as those led by Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.'s "nonviolent *direct* action" (the latter's term). King brought Christian theological elements of witness, neighbor love, and especially consideration of one's own motivations to classic civil-disobedience techniques.

²⁶The classic statement of the Anabaptist tradition can be found at the website Anabaptists, www.anabaptists.org/history/the-schleithem-confession.html. It is noteworthy that classical Baptists have not accepted this Anabaptist position. In fact, in 1524 the five Baptist churches of London

So, the authentically Protestant pacifist position since the Reformation is one associated with classic Anabaptists. It comes to a very different definition of Christian citizenship in this world from Augustine, Calvin, Luther, John Wesley, Roger Williams, and others. Classic Anabaptist pacifism says that the Christian should pray for those who restrain evil but not participate in public service because it will dirty one's hands and nullify the witness of the believer. Anabaptists do not believe that in the New Testament era God called some Christians to serve in public life. They do not believe that Christians have a responsibility to protect their fellow citizens except via prayer, witness, and humanitarian service.

More can be said in a later chapter about variants of pacifism that rely on personal feelings, a preference to not get involved in the mess of political life, merely sentimental solidarity with the vulnerable without a sense of responsibility to protect, and the like. But, at the end of the day, the Anabaptist model has not been embraced by the majority of Christians over the past two millennia because it denies doctrines of activated neighbor love via vocations of public service and stewardship. Indeed, when we think about Christian heroes such as William Wilberforce, who led the fight against the slave trade in the British Parliament; Abraham Kuyper, who defended a Christian model for politics as prime minister in the Netherlands; or Christians motivated to abolish slavery, stop genocide, and shutter concentration camps, we can conclude that just statecraft was not just for Moses, Hezekiah, and Nehemiah, but it is an honorable and necessary calling today. As

publicly dismissed the Anabaptist position. Here is an excerpt from the Schleithem Confession:

VI. We are agreed as follows concerning the sword: The sword is ordained of God outside the perfection of Christ. . . . In the perfection of Christ, however, only the ban is used for a warning and for the excommunication of the one who has sinned, without putting the flesh to death—simply the warning and the command to sin no more. . . .

It will be asked concerning the sword, Shall one be a magistrate if one should be chosen as such? The answer is as follows: They wished to make Christ king, but He fled and did not view it as the arrangement of His Father. Thus shall we do as He did, and follow Him, and so shall we not walk in darkness. . . .

Finally it will be observed that it is not appropriate for a Christian to serve as a magistrate because of these points: The government magistracy is according to the flesh, but the Christian's is according to the Spirit; their houses and dwelling remain in this world, but the Christian's are in heaven; their citizenship is in this world, but the Christian's citizenship is in heaven; the weapons of their conflict and war are carnal and against the flesh only, but the Christian's weapons are spiritual, against the fortification of the devil.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906–1945), who was martyred by the Nazis for his involvement in a plot to stop Hitler, concluded, “If we want to be Christians, we must have some share in Christ’s large-heartedness by acting with responsibility and in freedom when the hour of danger comes. . . . Mere waiting and looking on is not Christian behavior.”²⁷

Holy war. Sometimes just war thinking is mistaken for holy war (jihad, crusade) or militarism. The holy warrior believes that violence can be employed in defense of or to further eternal values. In practice, holy wars are often reactions to threats that seem to undermine the basic ideals and existence of one’s civilization. Thus the medieval Crusades (1095–1291) were largely a geopolitical response to the previous three centuries of Muslim warfare, beginning with the push of Islamic armies out of the Arabian Peninsula in AD 632 and advancing, within just a century, across the Levant to Persia in the East and, westerly, across North Africa and Spain, only to be blunted by Charles Martel at Tours (France) in 732. For the next three centuries, Muslim armies hammered at the doors of Christian polities, most notably attack after attack on the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium). The First Crusade, launched in 1095, was in response to a direct appeal from the Byzantine leadership, from their capital in Constantinople (today’s Istanbul), for aid against this scourge. Thus, despite Hollywood depictions or the denunciations of al-Qaeda that the West is full of modern crusaders, we should recognize the geopolitics of many so-called holy wars in the past.

But what inspires the *individual* holy warrior? Of course, as skeptics like to note, it is entirely possible that material gain might stimulate participation, as it did for many during the creation of Spain’s empire in the New World or for many ISIS (Islamic State) fighters. Nevertheless, many holy warriors are motivated by other concerns. For one, holy warriors are provoked to action by righteous indignation. Their most personal convictions have not only been questioned but also affronted and defiled. The holy warrior feels compelled to action in defense of those ideals held most dear—faith in God and the religious community. The holy warrior may also seek an eternal reward. This does not necessarily indicate a “death wish,” but rather that the individual is convinced that her actions are in pursuit of

²⁷Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Life Together*, trans. John W. Doberstein (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1954), 64.

transcendent ends and that such behavior will please the deity she worships. Of course, some holy warriors seek glory in both the here and hereafter in the tradition of early martyrs of their faith.

More could be said about holy warriors, but the basic principle is that holy war can be based on zealous love for one's faith and that this justifies employing violence. What is most disconcerting about holy war is that if the *end* is absolute—the defense of God's name—then it is difficult to provide any ethical rationale for limiting the *means* employed. Holy warriors are not content with a “settlement” because they are attempting to inaugurate God's kingdom on earth. Hence the “excesses” of holy war: the extermination of entire cities during the rapid expansion of early Islam, the Inquisition and wars of the Counter-Reformation, the quasi-religious philosophy of the kamikaze, and the fatwas of Osama bin Laden resulting in al-Qaeda's attacks on civilian populations. For the holy warrior, the end justifies any means.

In practice, holy wars are usually a downward cycle of violence among ethno-religious groups. In a terrible spiral of destruction, holy wars usually involve religious people giving justifications for widespread violence directed at all the members of a targeted community (including women and children, the vanguard of the next generation of the other). Nonmilitary “soft” targets are often attacked, and when this includes houses of worship, a new, diabolical dimension to the conflict is introduced because adherents feel that the sacred has been defiled. Sadly, most wars that follow this path dehumanize the enemy and justify mass bloodshed as a glorious obligation to prove oneself by defending the faith.

We saw elements of this in the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. What began as the disintegration of the multiethnic federated country of Yugoslavia turned into a nightmare of atrocities. Religious leaders became involved by giving nationalistic sermons, justifying the arming of citizens, and appearing at militaristic rallies. Photos of those rallies show the “three-fingered salute,” associated in Orthodox Christianity with the Trinity, held aloft by crowds chanting for the destruction of their Muslim neighbors. Over time, houses of worship were deliberately demolished and the violence descended into scenes reminiscent of the Holocaust, where one side tried to exterminate the other based on the other's ethno-religious identity. That is so-called holy

war in the modern era. It is an abomination, whether practiced by the Serbs or by the Islamic State.

But what does Christianity have to say about what appears to be holy war commanded by God in the Old Testament book of Joshua? Christians have long distinguished between God's commands in the taking of the Promised Land and later biblical and New Testament history. When it comes to the Old Testament case, we have significant teaching that Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants have agreed on by the likes of Augustine, Calvin, Luther, and others. This teaching sees the period recorded in the books of Joshua and Judges thus: an omnipotent and loving God commanded all peoples to honor him, and in case after case humanity refused to do so. God, in his sovereignty, commanded that justice be rendered on various Canaanite peoples for their idolatry and immorality and divinely appointed the Israelites to employ that justice. It was a holy war in the sense that it was directly and divinely commanded by God although it was bound to a specific time and place. It is noteworthy that it was limited: Israel was not to employ force outside of geographical borders, nor was Israel to use it as a means of global conversion by force (there was a robust vehicle for voluntary conversion in Hebraic law). Israel was not rendering a verdict: God had done so directly, and his commandment was that Israel conquer the land and mete out God's judgment in a way that also returned Israel to its homeland. Christians believe that an omnipotent, good God is just in making such determinations but that this is a unique case in history and does not go beyond.²⁸

From David onward, and especially in the New Testament era (which continues to this day), God gave no such commands to his people. Consequently, most Christians look skeptically on the papal claims that drove the Crusades to liberate Palestine, although in the main these were largely defensive wars responding to Muslim aggression and thus justified.²⁹ If a

²⁸For an examination of the Canaanite warfare in its ancient Near Eastern context with hyperbole, see Paul Copan, *Is God a Moral Monster?* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2011); Copan and Matthew Flannagan, *Did God Really Command Genocide?* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2014); and Copan, *Is God a Vindictive Bully? Reconciling Portrayals of God in the Old and New Testaments* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2022).

²⁹See Jonathan Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?*, 4th ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009); Riley-Smith, *The Crusades, Christianity, and Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Thomas F. Madden, *The New Concise History of the Crusades* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013).

religious figure operates outside of Scripture and God's explicit divine command to enjoin a war of conquest on behalf of religious ends, it simply does not comport with classical Christian views, whether condoned by a pope in the eleventh century or a Serbian priest in the twentieth century. It is noteworthy that such calls to holy war are rooted first in the individual's clerical authority and second in the claim that holy war will purify the warrior (through struggle and sacrifice) and purify the land (by cleansing it of unbelievers). Consequently, the Crusades, though primarily a protective measure, may have technically been a "holy war" (or, better, "religious war") because an ecclesiastical official justified them, but that by itself does not make them "holy," "righteous," or "just." Christians do not believe that God has commanded total war on religious grounds in the New Testament era. It is only through the atoning work of Christ that humanity can be purified, not through individual works.

CONCLUSION: CHRISTIANS IN ALL PHASES OF WAR

Jesus' "turn the other cheek" idiom is often used in a way that loses sight of how Christians are called, both as citizens and especially in their differing vocations, to serve across all aspects of war and turmoil. Lewis understood this and illustrated it in the gifts given to the Pevensie children, who became the kings and queens of Narnia. Peter, as high king, was given a sword and shield. Susan was given a bow and, importantly, a horn. When that horn sounded the alarm, help would come. Lucy was given a small dagger for personal defense and a vial of precious healing ointment. Readers will recall that one of the most poignant scenes in the Narnia adventures is when Lucy, acting as a sister (private citizen), wants to focus her attention on her wounded brother Edmund rather than on caring for the crowds of wounded around her:

They found Edmund . . . covered in blood, his mouth was open, and his face a nasty green color. "Quick, Lucy," said Aslan. And then, almost for the first time, Lucy remembered the precious cordial. . . . Her hands trembled so much that she could hardly undo the stopper, but she managed it in the end and poured a few drops into her brother's mouth.

"There are other people wounded," said Aslan, while she was still looking eagerly into Edmund's pale face and wondering if the cordial would have any result. "Yes, I know," said Lucy crossly. "Wait a minute."

“Daughter of Eve,” said Aslan in a graver voice, “others also are on the point of death. Must more people die for Edmund?”³⁰

The point is that Lucy, in her role as queen and with the gift of a healing potion in her hands, has a responsibility to serve and heal, just as Susan has a responsibility to sound the alarm and Peter has a responsibility to protect and defend.

So, too, there are roles for Christians across the spectrum of insecurity. US military doctrine speaks of multiple phases of war and, to summarize, these range from the prewar state (insecurity, perhaps humanitarian crisis, perhaps the rise of authoritarian leadership, political belligerence) to the acceleration toward, and envelopment in, hot war, to the late conflict (negotiations going on, planning for the postwar, gearing up for postwar recovery, considerations of the new political order and justice), to the postwar phase. The goal for the latter is not just unstable peace that existed before the war. The goal is a better state of peace.

There are Christians who are called to serve in every phase of conflict. We want and need Christian diplomats who are working to soften disagreements, forge compromises, and even issue stern warnings. In some cases, these are “track two” diplomats, the term given to private-sector leaders (e.g., religious leaders, business leaders) who serve as private intermediaries to governments or their counterparts in other countries.

In areas where there is a humanitarian crisis, there are almost always Christians working via relief organizations (e.g., World Vision, Samaritan’s Purse, Operation Blessing): they are there before the UN and Western governments arrive, and the faith-based humanitarians will be there long after the UN departs. When the bullets start to fly, we need principled Christians to be involved in the halls of power making decisions, like Daniel and Joseph, and we need principled Christians operating in the military, adhering to the moral principles of just war thinking. At war’s end, Christians will continue to serve on the ground to ameliorate suffering. We also need Christians to bring their wisdom to negotiating the new political order, establishing reasonable justice, and seeking long-term conciliation.

To this point little has been said about forgiveness. Forgiveness is not easy to achieve between millions of people (collectives) via their governments. I

³⁰C. S. Lewis, *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe* (New York: Collier, 1950), 176-77.

have discussed political forms of reconciliation in the section on *jus post bellum*. However, there are a number of areas where Christians can work for conciliation at the individual level. In the church, pastors and spiritual leaders must preach that even in times of war, there is no place in the Christian heart for hatred. We fight for our country, for what is right, for our allies, to preserve human life and property, and for the vindication of rights. We do not fight for revenge, nor out of lust, hatred, or greed.

It is not only the warriors who need this message: it is especially needed for spouses, children, and parents of those in harm's way, the fallen, and the wounded. I recall the vitriol in my own grandmother's voice when one of my neighbors purchased a Japanese car in 1985, forty years after the Japanese surrendered. She could not imagine anyone buying anything from the "Japs who attacked us" on December 7, 1941. Pastors have a responsibility for leading their congregations through reflection, healing, and forgiveness.

Other Christians will serve in ministries of healing and conciliation. Some of this is the healing of the body, through the medical arts and sciences, whether triaging patients on the margins of battlefields or managing longer-term care and recovery of veterans at home. Many wounds are hidden but just as lethal, and we need Christian counselors, psychiatrists, and psychologists to serve as agents of healing for trauma, PTSD, moral injury, and moral bruising.³¹

In sum, there is no opt-out option for the people who call themselves Christ followers. Christians are called to serve in the time and place where

³¹It is beyond the scope of this chapter to go into the nuances of these categories. The best primer from an explicitly Christian perspective is Marc LiVecche, *The Good Kill: Just War and Moral Injury* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), recognized by previous generations with terms such as "shell shock," refers to a "broadly defined mental health disorder" emerging from "exposure to . . . or witnessing, a particularly kind of traumatic event, typically life threatening and of such intensity that it results in stressors outside the range of human experience." Note that PTSD's stressors are from "outside the sufferer," unlike other mental health problems (e.g., those associated with chemical imbalance). In recent years a different diagnosis, "moral injury," has been used to describe the "lasting psychological . . . impact of perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing witness to acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations." An example might result from a US Marine killing a child in combat, despite the fact that the thirteen-year-old Afghan male was shooting a rifle at the Marine under foggy conditions. Marc LiVecche differentiates moral *injury* from moral *bruising*, the latter a term for times when it is not forgiveness that is needed (no moral wrong was done, though a tragedy occurred) but rather vindication (yes, a tragedy occurred; here are the steps toward coming to terms with something that was entirely not your fault). See LiVecche's excellent discussion of these issues with definitions and citations (*The Good Kill*, 21-25).

God has put them and utilize the skills and talents he has given them. Thus, whether preparing the hearts of the local church to prayerfully respond to injustice and violence, caring for the destitute in a hospital in Africa, fighting on the frontlines to stop a genocide in the Middle East, negotiating a just peace treaty in Europe, protecting one's locale from criminals and terrorists, or serving the psychiatric needs of veterans on the home front, there are many, many roles that Christians are called on to play across the various phases of conflict. These important domains reflect virtuous callings, and we, as Christians, are motivated by love of God and love of neighbor to fulfill our vocations in them.

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